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PERSPECTIVE

adequate gauge for impairment.
Among patients whose sleep needs
are satisfied with the use of the
lower doses, unnecessary risk can
be avoided, and as the labels
point out, patients whose symptoms do not respond to the lower
doses can be given the higher
doses. The sex-specific labeling
revisions reflect an evidence-based
approach to risk management
and dose individualization.

Zolpidem and Driving Impairment
Disclosure forms provided by the authors
are available with the full text of this article
at NEJM.org.
From the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, Food and Drug Administration,
Silver Spring, MD.
This article was published on August 7,
2013, at NEJM.org.
1. Colten HR, Altevogt BM, eds. Sleep disorders and sleep deprivation: an unmet public
health problem. Washington, DC: National
Academies Press, 2006.

2. FDA drug safety communication: risk of
next-morning impairment after use of insomnia drugs; FDA requires lower recommended
doses for certain drugs containing zolpidem
(Ambien, Ambien CR, Edluar, and Zolpimist)
(http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
ucm334033.htm).
3. FDA drug safety communication: FDA
approves new label changes and dosing for
zolpidem products and a recommendation
to avoid driving the day after using Ambien
CR (http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
ucm352085.htm).
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1307972
Copyright © 2013 Massachusetts Medical Society.

The Unanticipated Consequences of Postponing
the Employer Mandate
Mark V. Pauly, Ph.D., and Adam A. Leive, M.Sc.

T

he Obama administration’s
decision to postpone implementation of the employer mandate is the latest in a series of
delays and alterations of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). But postponing the mandate — which
requires larger employers to offer lower-income workers health
insurance coverage similar to
that available in the new insurance exchanges, on equal and
affordable financial terms —
may create large ripple effects.
The good news is that as compared with instituting the mandate as planned, postponing it
should barely increase the number of uninsured Americans after
ACA implementation. But it affects other provisions, particularly the individual subsidies for
purchasing insurance, and creates distorted incentives that may
leave the government paying significantly more than planned.
More than 90% of Americans
who obtain private health insurance today receive it through employers, but the centerpiece of the
ACA’s effort to make coverage
more attractive to the uninsured
focuses on insurance exchanges

for individuals purchasing coverage directly. However, because
both consumers and employers
can in principle finance or obtain
private health insurance in either
setting, ACA provisions had to be
compatible with both coverage
channels. Moreover, the legislation created tax-financed subsidies for buying insurance only
through the exchanges while relying largely on regulations and
mandates to deal with employment-based coverage. Inevitably,
this grafting of a new institutional and subsidy structure onto
an already-complex system raises
problems of potentially incompatible and inequitable incentives.
Fortunately, postponing the
mandate will probably not vastly
increase the number of people
who remain uninsured, because
most large employers already provide health benefits. Most would
therefore face little burden in complying, even though the proximate
cause of postponement is apparently the challenge of drafting reporting requirements. The 95%
of firms that offer coverage,
however, don’t offer it to every
worker at low explicit premiums,
n engl j med 369;8
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often excluding part-time, new,
temporary, and low-wage workers.
About 10% of uninsured Americans (5.5 million people) live in
households with a worker affected by the large-employer mandate
(see table). The $10 billion in revenues expected from the mandate’s penalty (5 million uninsured
workers × $2,000) is a small fraction of the eventual cost of the
exchange subsidies. (The Congressional Budget Office estimates
that in 2023, with full implementation, the annual subsidy cost will
be $153 billion.1) So although the
mandate would have reduced the
coverage gap and raised some
revenue, the effects of delaying
it will be modest.
Meanwhile, the ACA’s individual mandate remains in place. To
the extent that this mandate
causes people to seek or retain
coverage, workers may still prefer their qualified coverage to be
furnished through work rather
than exchanges — especially if
they are uninsured or incompletely insured but have income
high enough that the tax exemption for employment-based coverage is worth more than their ex-
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financed subsidies and are “made
whole” through higher wages.
Higher-income workers could still
Income 138–400%
Income 138–350%
choose group insurance, taking
of the Federal
of the Federal
advantage of their larger tax break.
Insurance Status
Poverty Level
Poverty Level
The graph illustrates the value
no. in millions
of the exchange subsidy relative
Any
100.4
86.3
to the tax exemption for employerPublic insurance only
9.8
9.2
sponsored coverage according to
In firms with ≥50 employees
1.6
1.4
income. Of course, separating emPrivate insurance only
68.4
56.7
ployees in this way is complex,
Employer-sponsored insurance
62.3
51.4
but many firms already provide
In firms with ≥50 employees
49.1
40.1
different benefits to different
Individual market
6.0
5.3
classes of workers, who often
In firms with ≥50 employees
2.0
1.8
have different wage levels; for
Private and public insurance
5.7
5.0
example, some restaurants offer
Employer-sponsored insurance
4.8
4.2
low-premium coverage to management and key workers but not
In firms with ≥50 employees
3.6
3.1
to waitstaff. Paradoxically, the
Individual market
0.9
0.8
postponement does not reduce a
In firms with ≥50 employees
0.3
0.2
“burden” on employers as much
Uninsured
16.5
15.3
as it creates an opportunity for
In firms with ≥50 employees
5.5
5.1
them to work with their employ* Persons with incomes of 138 to 400% of the federal poverty level are eligible for
ees to take maximum advantage
subsidies to purchase insurance through the exchanges; for persons with incomes
of exchange subsidies.
of 138 to 350% of the federal poverty level, the value of the exchange subsidy
Crowding out of fully paid priroughly equals the value of the tax exemption for employer-sponsored insurance.
Data are from an analysis of the Current Population Survey, 2012 Annual Social
vate insurance by more generously
and Economic Supplement.
subsidized coverage has previously
been documented with Medicaid,4
change subsidy. The stimulus for level who already have large- but the threat it poses to the govthis middle-class minority to ob- group insurance. This goal was ernment budget for financing the
tain employer-sponsored insur- buttressed politically by the view ACA is much more substantial.
ance will be effective only if the that employers should pay their Under the old rules, enrollment
individual mandate is aggressive- “fair share” of the cost of cover- among people with incomes bely enforced — and it’s difficult to age out of their profits (despite low 400% of the federal poverty
tax workers who owe little in- strong economic arguments that level (the cutoff for subsidies) was
come tax and see coverage as un- workers ultimately pay for man- projected to total 19 million by
dated benefits through lower 2016, with modest growth thereaffordable.
But the demise of the em- wages or job loss2,3). To restrain after.1 But, as the table shows,
ployer mandate has a potentially lower-income workers from swap- more than 100 million Americans
more important side effect: it re- ping employer insurance for ex- live in households with a worker
moves incentives for employers change insurance, the regulations whose income falls between
to offer coverage to lower-income required employers with at least the Medicaid threshold and the
workers at low enough explicit 50 employees to offer coverage exchange-subsidy cutoff. Thus,
premiums that they would choose with low enough explicit premi- penalty-free crowd-out runs the
job-based coverage over exchange ums to keep the group alterna- risk of dramatically boosting fedcoverage. The ACA sought high tive more attractive.
eral outlays for subsidies. Accord“target efficiency” — aiming
With that threat gone, it may ing to our analysis of the Current
subsidies only at lower-income make sense for employers and Population Survey, an estimated
uninsured people without a large- lower-wage workers to implicitly 53 million Americans who are eigroup insurance option and agree to a deal whereby such ther employed by firms with more
avoiding having subsidies claimed workers buy insurance through than 50 employees or are such
by people at the same income exchanges using government- workers’ dependents would be eliEstimated Numbers of Americans Younger Than 65 Years of Age,
According to Insurance Status, Income, and Employer Size, 2011.*
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Subsidy as Percent of Premium for Silver Plan
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Size of Exchange Subsidies for Families with One Adult and Families with Two Adults,
According to Income Level.
Both single adults and married adults filing taxes jointly have positive taxable income,
in the 10% income tax bracket, at 138% of the federal poverty level when taking the
standard deduction and exemptions. If they must pay full taxes for Social Security
(12.4%) and Medicare (2.9%), their marginal tax rate is 25.3% until their income is
high enough to put them into the next income tax bracket. In 2013, single adults
reach the 15% marginal income tax bracket at $8,925 in taxable income, which corresponds to about 165% of the federal poverty level for total household income, and
married adults filing jointly reach it at $17,850 in taxable income, or about 243% of
the federal poverty level for total household income. A silver plan is an insurance policy that covers 70% of insurable spending, on average, for an average person buying
private insurance. Data are from the Kaiser Family Foundation Subsidy Calculator.

gible for subsidized exchange
coverage. If they moved to exchanges, the annual subsidy bill
could nearly triple.
Of course, paying a much
larger subsidy to lower-income
households without employersponsored insurance than to
those with it was always going
to cause instability. For example,
employers already threatened to
cut low-wage workers’ hours below the law’s 30-hour-per-week
cutoff to avoid paying for their
insurance. But potential (and now
legal) employer responses to
those nonneutral payments will
exacerbate the instability. Dropping the employer mandate may
boost enrollment in the exchanges, leading to such high expenditures on subsidies that taxpayer
and political support for the ACA
is weakened. Even unions have

now reversed their earlier support
for the legislation by demanding
that their members who are covered by multiemployer plans (“TaftHartley plans”) receive exchange
subsidies, too.
Such changes may have other
implications. Current employerpaid coverage is most generous in
terms of physician and hospital
reimbursement. Considerable evidence suggests that plans must be
frugal in their provider payments
to qualify for many states’ exchanges and to constitute economical options for consumers.
Both lower reimbursement rates
and stricter managed-care rules
may limit treatment of patients
who formerly had more permissive insurance.
Our large, employment-based
insurance system has historically
been propped up by tax subsidies
n engl j med 369;8
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that make it cheaper than directly purchasing individual insurance.
For the lower-middle-income population, the ACA reverses this
distortion, potentially shifting
the inequity in the opposite direction. Group coverage has some
merits: when managed by a wellrun, attentive benefits department,
it can be less administratively
costly than individual insurance,
better tailored to workers’
needs, and less prone to adverse
selection. Economically, it would
be ideal to offer equal subsidies
regardless of how a person obtains qualified coverage, creating efficient choices between
individual and group coverage.
Perhaps the current threat to the
employer mandate and target efficiency will induce us to confront the full fiscal cost of fair
subsidies. Making subsidies
available on a uniform basis at
each income level would ideally
lead to better choices of insurance products, less heated political rhetoric, and an opportunity
to focus on other pressing problems in our health care system.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors
are available with the full text of this article
at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Health Care Management, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
This article was published on July 31, 2013,
at NEJM.org.
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